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Introduction  
In late April 2018, a controversy erupted in the social media after an 
American high school student, Keziah Daum posted her high school 
graduation pictures on twitter. She was wearing a Chinese Cheongsam. 
She was heavily criticized by the Chinese diaspora community in the 
social media and was condemned for a mindless appropriation of a 
Chinese cultural outfit.  A twitter handle, @Jeremy2 Lam bitterly 
complained, “my culture is not your god***prom dress.” @gGavo Dude 
accused her of living a clueless and meaningless life, “what is the 
theme of your life? Ignorant? (sic).” The most ostentatious criticism 
came from Jeannie @JeannieBeannie99: “This isn’t ok. I wouldn’t wear 
traditional Korean, Japanese or any other traditional dress and I’m 
Asian. I wouldn’t wear traditional Irish or Swedish or Greek dress either. 
There is a lot of history behind these clothes. Sad.” These criticisms 
which range from benign outrage of cultural insensitivity to a more 
serious charge of cultural imperialism and mostly came from Chinese 
diaspora community.  
 
A few days later, social media reaction from mainland China showed a 
stark difference from the diaspora outrage. In fact, by May 1, an 
editorial in the Wenxue City News praised and applauded the student’s 
creative adaptation of a Chinese cultural artefact. Amid mostly positive 
reactions and outpouring of support, a reader commented, “very 
elegant and beautiful! Really don’t understand the people who are 
against her, they are wrong!” The reader even recommended that 
Chinese government, state media and fashion industry extend her an 
invitation to visit China for cultural display. The cheongs, another 
reader claimed “is not cultural theft” but in fact a “cultural appreciation 
and cultural respect.” A position supported by another person who 
argued that “Culture has no borders. There is no problem, as long as 
                                                 
 
1 I dedicate this essay to the Jesuit, Rev. Ray Salomone, SJ (1933-2018) who taught 
me the virtue of tolerance.  
2 It is ironical that “Jeremy” is not a Chinese name even if used as a pseudonym 
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there is no malice or deliberate maligning. Chinese cultural treasures 
are worth spreading all over the world.” The most sympathetic 
comment was from twitter handle, another mother @ user handle 
YingLi: “I am a Chinese woman. I support you. You rocked that dress!! I 
have an 18-year-old daughter who just had her prom. She said people 
might be just jealous that you looked awesome in that dress.” And 
from CYLinTW, expressing gratitude for her use of the cheongs: “Thank 
you for letting everyone know the beauty of Chinese culture.”  
 
As to whether her action constitute a cultural spite, Ms. Daum was 
adamant: “To everyone causing so much negativity: I mean no 
disrespect to the Chinese culture. I’m simply showing my appreciation 
to their culture. I’m not deleting my post because I’ve done nothing but 
show my love for the culture. It’s a fucking dress. And it’s beautiful.” 
But why would what ordinarily seem like a genuine benign activity 
generate such emotive and passionate debate in the public sphere? 
The elephant in the room is culture. Why is conversation on culture a 
sensitive topic? Could we not share culture? Is culture a closed system 
of values or is it open to change? Could it be that we often impose a 
rigid category of identity schema and codify it as culture? Is culture a 
top-down mandate of homogenous values, a dogmatic effusion of 
reality or bottom up generation of human contingencies that are in 
constant flux, sensitive to history and context?   
Writing for the London Independent, Eliza Anyangwe dismissed Ms. 
Daum’s explanation, arguing instead that her action merely reinforces 
cultural domination, where cultural appropriation is all about “power” 
insofar as Ms. Daum remains an “embodiment of a system that 
empowers white people to take whatever they want, go wherever they 
want and be able to fall back on: ‘well I didn’t mean any harm’” 
(Anyangwe). For Anyangwe, cultural attire such as the cheongsam is a 
symbolic representation of our human expression. What we wear and 
how we wear it are symbolic representation of who we truly are insofar 
as it is constitutive of our cultural identity. Drawing parallel with the 
public outcry against UK’s Prince Harry’s Nazi-like costume for  a fancy 
dress party in 2005 (The Independent, January 13, 2005), and  New 
Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern choice of a Māori cloak during 
a meeting of the heads of Commonwealth of Nations in April 2018 
(The Independent, April 20, 2018), Anyangwe concludes that clothing 
is a cultural schema of a people and when “appropriated” by the likes 
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of Ms. Daum, the  PM or Prince Harry, it becomes a symbolic 
representation of power to dominate or occupy.  
 
The challenge here is that things like clothing even where they signify 
“cultural attributes” are primarily material as they are fixated only at the 
moment of expressiveness. Beyond this point, cultural artefacts as 
material representation of cultures are rarely immune to change. Just as 
culture evolve, these artefacts evolve in symbolic meaning and 
representation. Would the swastika evoke such powerful emotive 
revulsion if the Nazis never came to power? Would it make a difference 
if the New Zealand PM was Māori and yet in power? What would be 
the boundaries of cultural infusion and effusion?  Does cultural 
appropriation occur only when one from a dominant culture practices 
it? Is it then synonymous with power? What are its boundaries? Does it 
extend to everyday cultural practice like eating (other people’s food), 
clothing (wearing American Suit or some European dress as an African), 
hairstyle (braiding dreadlocks or using foreign hair extensions), theater 
(participating in English drama), even language (writing this essay, or 
speaking others like German, French or Xhosa), music (listening to 
country or blues)? Whom to love,3 et cetera. What could we 
appropriate or avoid? What are the limitations and consents? When 
does a cultural good become normalized and ceases to be 
“appropriation”?  
 
“Fed by the products of their soil, dressed in their fabrics, amused by 
games they invented, instructed even by their ancient moral fables”, 
Kwame Appiah has come to wonder:  “why would we neglect to 
understand the mind of these nations, among whom our European 
traders have traveled ever since they could find a way to get to them?” 
(Appiah xv).  Does not the fact that we already speak a language 
indicate that we are already inserted in the culture of those who speak 
those languages? What then defines culture? Is it dress? Is it cuisine? 
Is it aesthetics? Language? Traditions? Stories? Or Race?  But if 
language is a source and custodian of culture should we not then 
                                                 
 
3 If I may push the boundaries to extreme absurdity: whom to love - as a 
heterosexual black male: could I love a straight (or non-straight) white woman or 
man without defaulting on appropriation (since whiteness and straightness is a 
culture)? Could I even leave the boundaries of “maleness” and its misogynism and 
fall in love with a woman - black or white or yellow – since this too is cultural?  
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recognize that as soon as we begin to speak a foreign tongue we are 
“appropriating” the cultural artefacts of that society. As Fanon 
observed, if you want to have access to a culture, speak the language 
for “[a] man who has a language consequently possesses the world 
expressed in that language” (Fanon, Black Skin 18). But could I speak a 
foreign language without transforming it to suit my own experiences? 
English as a language for example has variations both in spelling, 
syntax or even pronunciation; it is not the property of English people 
alone. At the same time, to have a language is already a social contract 
that I agree to the meaning for words as products of the community. 
The same language we own, we disagree or agree within it (Appiah 
29ff). 
The aforementioned questions are my preoccupation in this essay. In 
what follows, I examine the dominant conversations on cultural 
appropriation. The first part of the essay will examine the ideological 
configuration of what constitutes cultural appropriation (hereafter as 
CA) first, as the politics of the diaspora and second, within a normative 
understanding of culture and its diachronic contradictions. This will be 
followed by a critical reevaluation of our subject theme as primarily a 
discourse of power with multiple implications. Framed as a discourse of 
power, CA is equally exposed to ideological distortions, and its critics 
becoming afflicted with the same virus they set out to cure in the first 
place.  I am interested in the aspect of culture as a constant location of 
tensions and rupture, yet constitutive of core credential in the making 
of modern identity. I argue that the failure   of dominant criticisms of 
cultural appropriation is precisely because they do not leave epistemic 
space for prior commitments: the internal variation of culture. If as 
critics have argued that CA enables cultural violence, we need to 
understand the epistemic space where cultural violence occurs in order 
to make a meaningful proposal for identity discourse and conversation. 
I will make a case for what may be termed multiple humanity (ies) as a 
way of transcending the homogenous claims imposed upon cultural 
memories. 
 
Cultural Appropriation as Politics of the Diaspora 
Defining cultural appropriation is intensely complex.  According to 
Bruce Ziff and Pratima Rao, it means “the taking – from a culture that is 
not one’s own – of intellectual property, cultural expressions or 
artifacts, history and way of knowledge…and profiting at the expense 
of the people of that culture” (1, 24). For Denise Cuthbert, it is an idea 
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that erupted as a reaction against the illicit “theft” of tangible cultural 
artefacts for exclusive or even shared usage by the “appropriator” and 
owners of such (258).  This meaning extends too to non-tangible 
materials like “a song, literary genres” or other forms of cultural 
representations over “which the people of [a] community concerned 
have little or no control” (Cuthbert 258). Although Cuthbert recognizes 
that cultural infusions by definition are multidimensional, she 
nevertheless ascribes “appropriation” to that which occurs when 
dominant culture take from “marginal, minority and colonized cultures”, 
whereas, the reverse becomes “assimilation” (258). For Raven Davis, 
cultural appropriation involves suppression of voice for a person of 
another culture, a selective adaptation of cultural goods; “manipulating 
or reinterpreting what’s been removed” and disrupting the “ability to 
keep cultural knowledge and teachings sacred” (Couchie et al).  
 
Asymmetries of cultural power becomes then the shibboleth for 
evolving criticisms of CA. Configured as responses to the evolving 
processes of social relations, the criticisms equally assume an 
ideological pose as discourse of liberation and power. But ideology 
often demands an audience.  It does not emerge in a vacuum, it always 
has a political space, negotiating between layers of social processes 
and relations. Its legitimation lies in its capability to produce meaning 
for its adherents. As an ideological discourse, CA is thus construed as 
universalistic designation through which critics forge a new 
consciousness that fuses cultural memory with homogenous claims on 
identity. Becoming functional as an ideology of power,4 its pose of 
repudiation also offers a political space, a space in which the universal 
is particularized (Buchanan 487) as a homogenous certainty - what I 
have termed for this purpose the politics of the diaspora.  
 
But who is the diaspora? Modern Western societies are often conceived 
as a “location of tolerance”; a geopolitical space not only of human 
progress but a domain where pluralism, multiculturalism and cultural 
diversity are actively promoted (McLeod 227). These representations 
nevertheless, are often cast in the shadows when confronted with 
                                                 
 
4 Power is understood here as ability to control, manage or influence the action of 
others. Yet, even without legitimation, i.e, [have authority], when applied to 
culture, [cultural] power can influence social change with huge socioeconomic and 
political consequences.  
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reality of subjective differences. The language of rights and its history 
thereof in the West would constitute “conceptual blinders” and would 
impose a misrecognition of the socio-economic and political 
inequalities experienced by the minority and migrant subcultures in 
these societies. It masks the reality that within the so-called Western 
liberal societies are invisible structures of inequalities, injustice, 
inhumanity which are very often direct cause or aftermath of these 
regime of rights.  As David Dabydeen argued, “cultural diversity” is a 
“cozy term” which “evolved out of a blend of European post-colonial 
guilt and enlightenment, to justify tolerance of our presence in the 
metropolis…a sizeable segment of the British people of certain 
generation, those above forty, say, would prefer it if we went away and 
never come back” (McLeod 227ff). The upshot is that these minority 
groups usually confine themselves to their own “cells” without any form 
of inter-cell communication or “cross-fertilization of cultures taking 
place” (McLeod 227). This the sociopolitical context in which the 
diaspora emerges. Cultural homeland offers an idea of an imagined 
community that is comforting and safe from the ripple effects of 
abstract modernity.   
 
Accordingly, the term diaspora evokes different sentiments for different 
cultural groups and communities. As Robin Cohen puts it, the diaspora 
refers to communities of people “settled outside their natal (or 
imagined natal) territories” and:  
[who] ‘acknowledge that ‘the old country’ – a notion often 
buried deep in language, religion, custom or folklore – always 
has some claim on their loyalty and emotions. That claim may 
be strong or weak … but a member’s adherence to a diasporic 
community is demonstrated by an acceptance of an inescapable 
link with their past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity 
with others of a similar background (ix). 
 
For my current purposes, I use the term in reference to the so-called 
third-world communities in the Western world for whom diaspora 
symbolizes “a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of 
home but lived in exile”  (Cohen ix). An active state of alienation, the 
unified sense of the “we” is a symbolic state in which the “old country” 
offers a cultural capital for subjective reclamation. It is this cultural 
capital that CA is threatening to existential bankruptcy. But this “we” is 
not a homogenous certainty; it is in fact derivative of a “differentiated, 
heterogeneous, converted spaces” (McLeod 207). 
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A pseudo political constituency colored by an ideology of superficial 
universalism, diaspora politics offers a modern political avatar as a 
response to the challenges faced by many who find themselves as 
liminal subjects in Western societies. Subjective in its criteria of 
reference, diaspora politics is a way of creating a subjective space for 
those who though belong to a society, yet they do not feel they are 
part of that society. The space thus created is at the same time cultural 
as it is political; a site of refusal, revolt but also subjective reclamation. 
Confronted with the anxiety of the present, the idea of a metaphysical 
homeland becomes attractive as a source of emotive and social stability 
for a disembodied subject. Writing on the African experience during 
colonialism, Es’kia Mphahlele offers a parallel example:  
 
It is significant that is not the African in British-settled territories 
– a product of ‘indirect rule’ and one that has been left in his 
cultural habitat – who readily reaches out for his traditional 
past. It is rather the assimilated African, who has absorbed 
French culture, who is now passionately wanting to recapture 
his past. In his poetry he extols his ancestors, ancestral masks, 
African wood carvings and bronze art and tries to recover the 
moorings of his oral literature, he clearly feels he has come to a 
dead-end in European culture (Mphahlele 25).  
 
While these diaspora citizens may not fight wars for their cultural 
homelands, pay taxes or even relocate to these places, they are those 
for whom culture plays an even more critical role in identity formation. 
This is the migrant who lives in a contested space, an anxious location 
of memories. Caught as he or she is between the old home and new 
home, she creates a new space for a new identity. In the Chinese 
example, the people in China thought it was actually a wonderful thing; 
but not so with the Chinese diaspora, some of whom are even 
Americans. Yet, the memory, the liminality, subjective uncertainty 
pushes one to reclaim. Identity here is not tangible, it is grounded in a 
utopian memory. The critique of those who appropriate is also an 
affirmation of identity - it is mine; it belongs to me.  
  
Beyond the Diaspora: What then is Cultural Appropriation?  
The phrase “cultural appropriation” is an evocative stimulus for an 
articulated form of resistance by subordinated groups anxious over 
“cultural erosion” and subsequent loss of identity. It nevertheless 
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assumes a unanimous character through which a majority subjective 
dominates and exploits a minority (or periphery) culture.  In the 
language of Deleuze and Guattari, the term “minority” is a complex 
phenomenon, existing only as a reference, a subjective footnote 
(Deleuze and Guattari).  Majority on the other hand indicates a 
constant, a standard or yardstick with which to measure an expression 
or content of that which is or which is not, who has potential to be or 
not to be.  Minority is a residual subjective; conceived only in reference 
to the majority which symbolizes “a constant, of expression of content, 
serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 105). If French in colonial West Africa for example, (although 
spoken by a minority) was a standard measure of humanity, then even 
as those who spoke it were a minority (less than majority black 
Africans), the few who spoke it still possessed symbolic majority since 
they are symbolic source of what it means to be a citizen in this 
colonial state. The French herein even if a minority represent symbolic 
majority and possesses “a state of power and domination” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 105). But what is culture? Thus far I have used the term 
with vague generalizations without any substantive content. Following 
Mahmood Mamdani, I will argue that the very notion of culture is 
“reproduced through socio-historical struggle which remains 
differentiated, diverse and heterogeneous.”  
 
The term culture generates degrees of representations depending on 
context (and sometimes) history of the speaker. In the six years that I 
taught cross-cultural communication in an American  university, I was 
intrigued that most of my students in response to the question what is 
culture or culture as metaphor would often give culturally differentiated 
responses shaped by their sociopolitical, historical  and everyday 
experiences:   Culture is like a pair of glasses, … the heart of a person, 
… sweet wine, … a good book or a beautiful painting, … a box of 
crayons, …a fruit, … beautiful salad, …an iceberg,  a box of chocolate, 
…DNA, … tomato plant, …a puzzle, …mosaic, … body, …computer 
brands – amongst other responses.  Very rarely in between years 
would a metaphor become repeated even as these students seem to 
come from what ordinarily look like a homogenous background: White, 
middle-class Americans. What this suggests is that the very idea of 
culture is as amorphous as those who speak of it. It is also an 
understanding which belies the façade of culture as a primordial 
universal of a given society. Culture is very rarely a primordial 
unanimity; it is essentially inclusive; contingent to change yet 
Cultural Appropriation and the Limits of Identity 
      
      Chiedza, Journal of Arrupe Jesuit University, Vol 20, No. 1 May 2018 16
transcends change without being any less active. This is what 
Mahmood Mamdani means in claiming that, “culture is as seldom as 
compact and singular as it is sometimes made out to be… it is full of 
tension, diverse and differentiated” (226). 
 
Derivative lesson from my students is that culture is a plethora of 
ambiguities. It is by nature constitutive of individuals (who practice it) 
and the practice thereof (values, customs) while simultaneously 
possessing an internal rationality. Culture and its subjects (or objects) 
evolve together. It is neither a readymade epistemic dress tailored to fit 
all sizes nor fixated on the past or the present. It evolves out of specific 
context, shaped by history but not entrapped within it. As context 
changes so does our understanding and application of culture. To 
codify culture as a dogmatic infusion of reality is to deny historical 
dynamism, a pernicious move that de-historicizes the subject (Mamdani 
226).   
 
Discourses on cultural appropriation often accentuate a rigid bent 
towards culture. For such theorists, CA is what happens when “a 
dominant culture adapts elements from a marginalized culture and uses 
it outside the original culture’s context – often without credit or against 
the wishes of the said culture” (Sharma). On this view, when culture is 
appropriated, it changes meaning and becomes diffused in terms of 
signification and symbolism. This change is what provokes resistance 
from those who “own” the culture insofar as the specific culture is a 
location of identity, a locus of re-imagination. On this point, culture is 
primarily an extension of the subject or as Raymond Williams noted, a 
cumulative of one’s overall lifeworld experiences such as the material, 
social, linguistic and intellectual (Kulchyski 606). The material is 
referential to “things” – the signifier (clothes, food, music); the 
intellectual is symbolic to ideological attestations in form of “thoughts 
and beliefs”; the social denotes kinship systems while linguistic 
connotes language.  
 
While cultural exchange is an inevitable reality between groups, critics 
have argued that the manner of such transmission is what constitutes 
appropriation or assimilation. Appropriation is what happens when a 
dominant group “takes” from a minority group. However, if and when 
reversal occurs, i.e. minority “taking” from majority group, it becomes 
assimilation (Ziff and Rao 5ff). The reasoning is that cultural 
appropriation is primarily a location of power, a one-way phenomenon 
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perpetrated by the dominant group.  Notice however that, the very idea 
of “dominant” is not problematized. Is it racial? Numerical? Economic? 
What is the threshold for this domination? Is dominant synonymous to 
subordination? Would minority rule under apartheid South Africa 
constitute dominant or subordinated or both? Whichever way, it is not 
precisely clear the extent to which the minority culture assimilates or 
conditions of such assimilation. Appropriation then becomes “creative 
pluralism where homogeneity had previously reigned” insofar as culture 
is an exclusive reserve of a primordial group fixated within exclusive 
time and space (Buchanan 491). 
 
In an attempt to explain cultural transitions, scholars often conflate 
culture with naturalism (and/or ethno-tradition), that is, as if culture is 
something one is born with.  Specific cultures are associated with 
certain groups as essentialized identity category. Upon this complexity 
derives the idea in which culture becomes enunciated as racialism, 
equally suggestive of culture as a closed system of values. Thus, we 
speak of Black, White, Asian cultures as some activity exclusive to 
people of racial categories.5 To the extent that these representations 
offer symbolic guide for an imagined community, this is certainly 
inescapable. The dangers are nevertheless three-fold. First, they distort 
the very notion of culture, projecting an image of a coherent 
universalism. Second, the complexities associated with culture as a 
location of tension, rupture and timeless fragmentations are 
obfuscated. Third, is a misrecognition that culture evolves within history 
and not outside of it. In projecting the image of coherence and 
homogeneity individuals are cast as passive recipients of culture. Yet, 
our relationship with culture is contemporaneous. We make culture, but 
culture shapes us. We respond to culture as it responds to us, we (i.e. 
betwixt culture and us) mutually reproduce each other according to 
history, context and environment. But – and this is a crucial caveat - we 
are the chief principals of culture. These are issues of most vivid 
concern as they are emotive for genuine debates on cultural 
                                                 
 
5 This understanding does not address the issue of parallel culture; “dominant” 
here is not cultural but political. This is primarily because “appropriation” (thus 
understood) does not seem to occur in cultural exchanges between two 
“dominant” cultures – like when the Dutch learns a drinking habit from the 
German or when the English “appropriates” certain cultural habits from the 
Swedes. This applies too to when minority groups “steal” from each other.  
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appropriation. In what follows, I will negotiate these issues in terms of 
claims and counter claims in ways in which cultures reproduce identity 
schemes and these in turn influence our own sense of being and 
becoming.  
 
If we draw our sense of identity from culture which by nature is fluid 
and placid, should our identity not remain discursive? If identity is 
multilayered, does cultural appropriation delegitimize our subjective 
enunciation? The challenge with dominant claims on CA is varied. First, 
it takes for granted that these are values shared or normatively 
inspired by all who subscribe to that culture. Second, the content, 
context and limitations of what constitutes our cultural space are not 
interrogated but assumed as given. Third, the interdependence of 
people across cultural boundaries ruptures any claim of homogeneity. 
Fourth, a denial of capacity for cultural role reversal is a denial of 
agency for the so-called peripheral group. The last point is even more 
critical since the minority group is even further subjugated through 
what may be termed auto-colonization or colonization of the subjective. 
Minority thus assumes a permanent feature of identity, frozen without 
discursive essence. This misunderstanding as I argued earlier is 
grounded in our vision of culture as timelessly homogenous; a 
“primordial universal” that is devoid of tension and ruptures. Cultural 
symbolic constitution6 is not naturalism but functional as residue of 
politics, religion and society. A “cultural symbolic constitution,” Ronald 
Inden then argues, “embraces such things as classificatory schema, 
assumptions about how things are, cosmologies, worldviews, ethical 
systems, legal codes, definitions of governmental units and social 
groups, ideologies, religious doctrines, myths, rituals, procedures, and 
rules of etiquette” (Cohn 173). 
 
In restricting the epistemic boundaries of appropriation and 
assimilation to performative pedagogy7 of dominant and minority 
groups (respectively), critics are problematizing cultural appropriation 
as a discourse of power and domination in which minority groups are 
                                                 
 
6 A term I borrowed from Bernard S. Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victoria 
India”, In the Invention of Tradition: Past and Present Publication, edited by Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, 104-164. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), p 173 
7 Performing ideology as culture 
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mere passive agents only capable of assimilating. Assimilation is 
construed as a direct response (of the subordinated group) to cultural 
imperialism (of the dominant group). But if cultural appropriation is 
about power differentials, does it occur when the largest English soccer 
club (with millions of fans and social power) appropriates the cultural 
mannerism of a side-street English soccer club? Since the social space 
of culture is not territorialized, what then happens when the French 
language as an element of culture is minority in Canada but majority in 
France or Belgium? Or English (cultural identity) being symbolic 
majority in the USA or Canada and yet political reason for subjugating 
minority non-French speakers in Cameroon? As Deleuze and Guattari 
put it, “the problem is not the distinction between major and minor 
language [M.E or culture]; it is one of becoming. It is a question not of 
reterritorializing oneself on a dialect or patois [or a sub element of 
culture] but of deterritorializing the majority language [or culture]”.  
 
In relocating cultural appropriation to the realm of politics, critics by 
way of double maneuver are able to frame CA as a movement about 
sociopolitical and economic rights8 of minorities, and critiquing 
appropriation is thus simultaneously an act of revolt and resistance 
against “cultural degradation” of the “integrity and identities of cultural 
groups” (Ziff and Rao 6). Here too, it becomes a question of identity 
politics.   As Ziff and Rao argue, cultural appropriation is tied to 
“misrecognition or nonrecognition” (11) which makes it possible for the 
continual disempowerment and continual colonization of “peripheral 
and subordinate subjects.” Citing Charles Taylor, they argue that, 
“nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced 
mode of being.” This citation nonetheless omitted the phrase “our 
identity is partly shaped” from the passage [my emphasis] (Taylor 25). 
In fact, Taylor is at pains to avoid homogenous claims on identity 
discourse and his focus is on ethics of subjective authenticity:   
 
There is a certain way of being that is my own. I am called upon 
to my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life. 
But this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. 
                                                 
 
8 Rights to their cultural heritage. Language of rights and claim of heritage suggests 
an economic dimension that seeks to safeguard cultural good from material 
exploitation. See Ziff and Rao, Borrowed Power, 6 
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If I am not, I miss the point for my life; I miss what being human 
is for me. This is the powerful moral ideal that has come down 
to us. It accords moral importance to a kind of contact with 
myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as in danger of 
being lost, partly through the pressures toward outward 
conformity, but also because in taking an instrumental stance 
toward myself, I have lost the capacity to listen to this inner 
voice. It greatly increases the importance of this self-contact by 
introducing the principle of originality: each of our voices has 
something unique to say. Not only should I not mold my life to 
the demands of external conformity; I can’t even find the model 
by which to live outside myself. I can only find it within 
[empahsis in the original] (30). 
 
Taylor is criticizing the scripted narrative identity where we become 
copies of others. This is the point of misrecognition as triggers for 
subjective fatality because of its sociopolitical and economic 
consequences such as stigmatization, alienation or outright deprivation. 
Critics of cultural appropriation often assume a primordial character of 
identity. Yet identity far from being a monolithic concept, drawn from 
one historical experience is notoriously vague, a multilayered, 
“ideological baggage” which is socially produced or culturally enabled” 
(Eze, “The Politics of Being Human” 300). Yet remains an “ever-present 
phenomenon… irreducible to merely a metaphysical doctrine…. [or] an 
epistemological question.” What this means is that Identity is 
constitutive of what may be termed convoluted narrative-spaces or “an 
inchoate collection of subjectivities” (Eze, “The Politics of Being 
Human” 300).  It becomes possible to possess different identity all at 
once: I am Roman Catholic, Igbo, American, Black, African, historian, 
Sufi and a member of the Green Party. They are parallel and sometimes 
potentially contradictory but speak to me as possessing “multiple 
possible selves” all which colors my identity as an individual.   
 
But even as I recognize these substantive layers of my identity I still 
have to contend with negotiating a less recognizable but nevertheless 
insidious pathology of culture, embedded in what I distinguish for this 
purposes, macro and micro culture.  By macro and micro culture, I 
mean to suggest that culture is beyond an act or practice internal to 
the goods of our community it also includes those goods external to 
us. Macro points to those globalized attributes and tendencies of 
culture, externalized and reproduced as “pedagogical narratives and 
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rituals.” Micro culture on the other hand embodies intricate layers of 
complexities; often subtle, sometimes invisible from everyday practice 
as in the relationship between young and old, male and female, 
between relatives, within family, school mates, best friends, et cetera.  It 
is in this domain of micro culture that cultural violence mostly takes 
place as in those instances when macro culture is appropriated, 
enforced and internalized as local truth. The micro culture adopts 
cultural universals often anachronistic to the micro-context.   
 
If our identity is thus multilayered; it also means that at one time we 
belong to a dominant group and other times a minority group. Which 
means too that we both appropriate and assimilate; simultaneously 
turning us into cultural villains and victims; imperialists and subjects - 
all at once. In September 2018, the Texas Republican Party in an 
election commercial had equated the American’s Republican Party 
symbol with the Hindu deity, Ganesha. As I will show later, critics of 
cultural appropriation are unable to reconcile the seeming tension 
where a cultural dislocation in one territory is potentially a ripple effect 
of that culture’s domination in other socioeconomic or geopolitical 
spaces. If we adopt the criteria of “appropriation” in this case, would 
the American Republicans constitute a minority or majority culture? If 
majority, then how do we reconcile the fact of over a billion Hindus 
compared to a few million American Republicans? Where it is construed 
as minority, then it undermines the core definition for what constitutes 
cultural appropriation, i.e. “taking” from dominant culture. Yet, we 
cannot underestimate the associative trauma accompanying this 
politicization of a people’s cultural identity.  The challenge here is not 
so much the subsisting binary, but that the notion of minority versus 
majority is never really a cultural reference as opposed to an epistemic 
reference for politics of identity. Relocated in this realm, it becomes 
meaningful to expand the conversation and articulate what the terms 
symbolize and make meaningful statement on them.  
 
While assimilation is thus presented as a benign cultural performance, I 
will argue that it is in fact a site of subordination with evolving 
repercussions: First, as an ideological practice of colonialism in which a 
numerical “minority” group subordinates a numerical “majority.” As 
indicated earlier, minority and majority are primarily symbolic. Second, 
in proposing assimilation, scholars instead of offering absolution to the 
sin of appropriation (for minorities) are actually imposing objectifying 
eccentricities upon these groups and cultures. In colonial Africa, the 
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principle of assimilation was an administrative policy employed by the 
French and Portuguese to foster divide and rule through state 
bifurcation and subjective differentiation of Africans into citizens and 
subjects. To be assimilated offered one access to European identity – a 
citizen of the colonial state. The non-assimilated remains a subject of 
the colonial state and as such subject to the full wrath of colonial 
violence. The assimilated however, would have to speak either French 
or Portuguese excellently, be a Christian, Western educated and 
abandon all attachment to indigenous ways of life. To be assimilated is 
to become a new creation, Westernized insofar as colonial citizenship 
equals dignity. But it also suggests subjective dislocation; one had to 
abandon his or her identity to become a mimicry of Western modernity. 
Thus, both appropriation and assimilation primarily inhere the same 
intentionality towards homogenization of individual particularities and 
subjective annihilation. Appropriation and assimilation equally open a 
critical convergence that both indict peripheral subjectivities and yet 
create space to mask their visibilities. The foregoing ambivalence is 
what shapes the epistemic commitment of CA as a critical ideology. On 
the one hand, criticisms are wedged as a “protectionist” ideology of 
the diaspora, to safeguard corruption/degradation of cultures and 
other forms of cultural imperialism.  On the other hand, they insert a 
globalized cultural experience as an authentic reflection of indigenous 
cultural goods and values. As Homi Bhabha would note however, this 
idea of culture as holistic, separated, unique, static, embodying ‘pre-
given cultural contents and custom” is a false illusion. Culture is 
permeable, with “porous borders,” “leaking into each other, 
crisscrossing supposed Barriers.” (Bhabha 34, McLeod 228). I concur 
with Bhabha that “cultural interaction emerges only at the significatory 
boundaries of cultures, where meanings and values are (mis)read or 
signs are misappropriated” (Bhabha 34).   
 
In the next section, I will offer a theoretical framework for what I have 
termed multiple humanity (ies). Instead of wholesale dismissal of CA as 
critical ideology, I shall examine the merits of the ambivalence it 
inspires in the context of the shifting and often critical relationship 
between culture, history and identity or as John McLeod puts it, “the 
subscription to a notion of culture as interactive, constantly 
recomposed from a wide variety of possible sources becomes an 
important political act” (McLeod 228). Framed as an ideology of power, 
appropriation and assimilation equally yield to hybridity of cultures.  
Instead of hybridity, I propose confluence of cultures.  The explanatory 
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weight of a confluence narrative is suspicious of hybridity of cultures 
which projects epistemic dislocation of the subject. In hybridity the 
object and subject are one and the same thing. There is no space for 
negotiation or creative tension. The purpose of tension and space is for 
regeneration, growth, knowledge and viability. Hybridity offers 
parochial universalism which dislocates the individual who is then 
grafted in an alien metaphysical foundation. As I have argued 
somewhere else, a “confluence of narratives” is a creative meadow of 
identity negotiation (Eze, Intellectual History) 
 
Beyond Cultural Appropriation: A Case for Multiple Humanity (ies)  
My analysis thus far has however failed to accommodate the 
psychosocial implications of CA as a cultural practice. This is primarily 
the material dispositive of culture where culture is “commodified” for 
the benefit of the appropriator and subsequently diminishing the 
material value of the subordinated culture. In an interview with 
Canadian Art journal, Nancy King (a.k.a Chief Lady Bird hereafter as 
CLB), invited us to ponder the psychosocial and material impact of 
Picasso’s appropriation of African masks in his creation of “cubist 
visualities” for which he achieved international fame (Canadian Art May 
16 2018). To what degree does this impact the value of the original 
African masks? Notice the intuitive link between Picasso’s action and 
colonial policy of exploiting non-Western societies for the benefit of 
Europe as characterized by Fanon: “The wealth which smothers her 
[Europe] is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped peoples. 
The ports of Holland, the docks of Bordeaux and Liverpool were 
specialized in the Negro slave-trade, and owe their renown to millions 
of deported slaves” (Fanon, The Wretched 81).  
 
Beyond the material dispossession is a question of depersonalization 
and identity fragmentation as CLB puts it: “by positioning Picasso as 
one of the greats in Westernized art history canons, non-indigenous 
students end up internalizing and normalizing a culture of 
appropriation within contemporary art” (Couchie et al.). This is what 
Homi Bhabha referred to as mimicry of the colonial subjective and 
Fanon terms “colonization of the mind” through internalization of 
colonial logic (Fanon, The Wretched 219ff, Bhabha 85). According to 
this logic, material and physical space can only be subjugated when the 
mind is colonized. Colonization of the mind becomes operationalized 
through displacement and domination of the indigenous cultures often 
substituted with European cultural goods cast as a universal moral 
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good (Fanon, The Wretched 219). Appropriation thus understood not 
only legitimatizes this cultural dislocation, it imposes a psychosocial 
violence on the native who only begins to think of his or her culture as 
naturally inferior to whites. Subjective redemption is only possible with 
touch of a white humanity. We become human only when we mimic or a 
totality of subjective embrace of Western culture.  Appropriation 
becomes an act of civilization – to touch, to humanize or make visible 
non-Western cultures that would otherwise remain at the fringes of 
humanity. These cultures become animated at this point of encounter 
(with whites). 
 
Problematized thus far, CA as a critical ideology gains a new 
intentionality. First the term as used suggests impossibility of cultural 
exchanges which as we have seen earlier is an epistemic cul-de-sac. 
Second, the problem is not with appropriation but the nature of 
appropriation that occurs. Third, if our critical focus is on the material 
and psychosocial impact of appropriation, then we ought to avoid 
arbitrary claims of homogenous certainty and instead negotiate those 
instances where CA becomes (i) inevitable reality of human co-existence 
and/or (ii) embody colonialist tendencies.9 I propose that CA (without 
colonialist tendencies) offers creative cultural energy as a gift for 
humanity. This gift is only accessible through the space of dialogue. I 
will propose two kinds of dialogue and show to what extent they 
critique and affirm our notions of interculturality.  
 
When I sing or listen to the Negro spiritual Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,10 
I experience a metaphysical connection with African slaves in the 
American plantations. I connect as a black person, a connection that 
might not be easily accessible to others (not impossible). This song is a 
story, a history and at the same time a performance of survival and 
loss, hope and anxiety. The context in which the song was written and 
performed enacts a subjective conversion. I feel its story, and its 
history, I recognize the intention, I put myself in their shoes. An 
exclusive empathy occurs as the song, the lyrics speaks to the depth of 
                                                 
 
9 Cultural domination for purpose of exploitation and/or psychosocial or physical 
annihilation.  
10 Credited to Wallace Willis, the song was composed circa 1865 but became 
popularized by the Fisk Jubilee Singers during their tour of the Underground 
Railroad.  
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my being. It is a song of celebration and yet of revolt, revolt against 
oppressive structures, against slavery, against those who oppressed 
others just because they were like me. This song has a symbolic 
meaning for me; to think of a people enslaved and oppressed for no 
other reason than their race. It is a spiritual and emotive connection to 
me as a black person provoking a moral empathy for action or inaction.  
Located in the history, the Spiritual embodies a mythic narrative of 
coded messages, “one designed at the time to lead slaves to the 
mythical Underground Railroad” (White). It is constitutive as a spiritual 
cry for freedom from the anguish of the present, but also symbolic plea 
for the abolitionists to hasten to their rescue. Yet, does it mean that I 
own this history, this piece of cultural history? What happens when and 
if the context exchanges? Does this delegitimate the original intent for 
which the song was written and strip it of meaning?  
 
In contemporary history, the Spiritual evokes a new intentionality for 
English rugby fans who have adopted it as celebratory hymn over 
opponents (White). In this way, the song is not just a cultural residue of 
a people’s past; it evokes a symbolic sense of present and past 
identity; contextual meaning and a primordial universal communion – 
not only for blacks but as claimed by English rugby fans.  The 
adaptation is not a mere “textual poaching” in which “fans of popular 
culture”, freely borrow cultural goods and mass culture of other 
communities; “claiming its materials for their own use, reworking them 
as the basis of their own cultural creations and social interactions” (Ziff 
and Rao 1, 24). As Deleuze would have argued, this adoption 
engenders “multiplicity of actualization”, somewhat “a condensation of 
distinctive points or an open collection of intensities” (257ff). Here, 
culture transcends primordial universalism for civic universalism, one 
that is mobile, creative, casual and yet “endowed with margins” 
(Deleuze 257). The margins define its location, but also, offers space 
for negotiations, adaptation and appropriation. The song as used (by 
the English) neither speaks in terms of experience nor history but to 
the context of the present; yielding to metaphysical euphoria of the 
present time.  
 
Where it is presented as a homogenous source of identity, the 
adaptation is not so much an appropriation as it is an invasion of a 
subjective social space. The problem is not cultural but rupture of a 
primordial source of black identity cast through historical experiences 
of slavery, oppression and black resistance. On this point, the song is a 
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subjective repertoire of black identity; symbolic of blackness as 
concocted in history, politicized, abused and redeemed within history. 
It is a song but also a subjective biography that speaks in terms of our 
unique location in history. But it is also prophetic, offering a discursive 
sense of identity. Accordingly, the usage of the song by English rugby 
fans while not at default for appropriation, nevertheless thrives through 
a suppression of history and “mobilization of bias” for cultural violence. 
In suppressing history, it seeks to invent a new identity; one that colors 
the past as a space of innocence or even perhaps, benign empty space. 
Denial of history imposes a misrecognition of the cumulative variances 
which gave rise to the song.  
 
Yet, history is neither a collation of dogmas nor a space of innocence. 
History like culture is equally “full of tensions.” As Howard Zinn noted, 
“There is no such thing as impartial history. The problem with historical 
honesty is not outright lie; it is omission or de-emphasis of important 
data – the definition of importance is dependent on what constitutes 
one’s values” (30). Value, de-emphasis, omission, et cetera, rather than 
being a critique of appropriation is in fact an indictment of history. 
Beyond history, critique of appropriation falters. Even though history 
offers us a source of modern black identity, we are not entrapped to 
this past as a homogenous experience. Black identity is discursive. It is 
not only a collation of distinct experiences; it is history but not limited 
to history. The purpose of history is to historicize these black 
experiences not only as a passive or oppressed subject but an active 
heroic agent within history. This understanding is critical in order to 
frame a new understanding of culture that is not merely a residual 
narrative of colonial historicity. When we out strip our culture’s capacity 
for variation contingencies we have become, in the words of Okot 
p’Bitek “mercenaries in foreign battles none of which was in the 
interest of African peoples… intellectual smugglers” (102, 107). 
Somewhere else I have termed this phenomenon colonization of 
subjectivity.11 What this means is that our response to denial of history 
is merely an affirmation to the superiority of Western epistemic premise 
of coloniality. We are responders, responding to the intellectual gaze of 
Western historicity. The story may be told by us but it is not really our 
story. Colonization of subjectivity enunciates mimicry. Mimicry 
                                                 
 
11 See, Eze, Michael Onyebuchi, Intellectual History in Contemporary South Africa, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
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disempowers. In response to my terms of engagement you are also 
surrendering your right of authorship of your subjectivity. In fact, 
precisely because I determine the rules of the game and manner of 
your response I am ultimately your subjective biographer. I am your 
story teller both in content and motive – I own you!   
 
 Culture is meaningful not only because of the past, but also because of 
our present encounters and experiences; a constant variation. This is 
what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they argue that “you will never 
find a homogenous system that is not still or already affected by a 
regulated, continuous, immanent process of variation” (103). To view 
culture as discursive in this sense is to understand that culture shapes 
our identity, but it is in turn shaped by us. It is true that identity is 
constitutive of culture but if culture is never a fixed phenomenon so is 
our identity – always at the interstices of historical transitions, fleeting 
experiences and encounters with “other” cultures. It is a vision of the 
world as perceived in the past and constructed in the moment. To 
freeze these interactions with the anathema of appropriation is equally 
to freeze ourselves as mobile subjects.  
 
The African political theory of ubuntu/botho offers a critical insight as 
to what constitutes this mobile identity.  In Xhosa/Zulu, the aphorism, 
Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu “a person is a person through other 
people” offers a vision of multiple humanity (ies) constitutive of 
humans, non-humans, animals, animate and inanimate beings. Our 
vision of the world is not primarily dependent on who we are as 
humans alone. Beyond these multiplicities, ubuntu advocates mobile 
subjectivity which recognizes our overall of humanity as a dialogic 
process of relation and distance. Ubuntu is an active-passive 
philosophy which offers us a theoretical disposition for epistemic 
transcendence (neither fixated nor dogmatic); it offers a framework to 
recognize, as William James wrote, that “in every concrete individual, 
there is a uniqueness that defies formulation. We can feel the touch of 
it and recognize its taste so to speak, relishing or disliking, as the case 
may be, but we can give no ultimate account for it…” (qtd. in Kaye 
178). This uniqueness is the foundation of our cultural capital. The 
validity of our cultural capital is dependent on our individuality and 
uniqueness! It is to say, we are no longer monads but differentiating 
beings with unique identities which we bear as capital gifts to other 
persons. “Capital” gift indicates a subjective self-offering that seeks the 
nourishment of the self through a celebration of the other. 
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Appropriation thus understood is neither constituted as a negation of 
the subject nor inhibition of mobility. It is functional as a “creative act” 
of human survival:  
 
It is through the practices of everyday life – the multiplicity of 
‘uses’ to which social structures, the regulatory bodies that 
shape culture and cultural commodities, the already 
appropriated and about to be appropriated items that combine 
with desire to produce a culture, are put – that the passively 
formed subject becomes active [emphasis in the original] 
(Buchanan 487). 
 
Cultures do not survive in isolation; they thrive in tensions and strife 
with other cultures. Where culture is conflated with race, the critique of 
cultural appropriation inevitably becomes a critique of whiteness and 
not necessarily for cultural theft. However, it is only when we offer 
space for difference as constitutive of our humanity are we able to 
convey the distinctive and unique gifts embedded in our cultures and 
in that process “avoid crude reversals of racial binaries in favor of more 
contextualized and flexible identity categories” (Wasserman). 
 
Transcending “crude reversals” is a call for interculturality through 
cultural encounters. There are two kinds of encounters in dialogue. The 
first, what I have termed encounter-in-dialogue departs from the 
position of subjective appreciation, enrichment or celebration. Here we 
meet the other as an equal - a gift to my humanity, a being to be 
celebrated. On this point, the other who is different from us is a 
subject, a being like us both in dialogue and subjective affirmation.  
The second kind of encounter is what I have termed encounter-to-
possess. Herein, the point of encounter is for domination or obsession. 
We encounter the other but only to possess him or her, what they have 
(skills, beauty, wealth, sex, et cetera). We do not see them as equals but 
objects, a material being useful only for my fantasy. This is also the 
context of obsession, fatalism, fixation, addiction, sexism, paranoia and 
colonial-minded appropriation. The first kind of dialogue is primarily 
invested in context of human experience geared towards subjective 
equality. The second is an abstract form of engagement, insensitive to 
what Clifford Geertz described as “its internal structure, independant 
de tout sujet, et de toute objet, de toute contexte.” (449). However, 
this idea of giftedness would have to be qualified. It does not mean 
subjective appropriation of the other in their otherness. What dialogue 
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does is to offer me the gift of recognition that one is first and foremost 
human; and second, it offers a space for education.12 Here dialogue 
becomes a moment of education; unveiling of ignorance – educating 
our subjectivity. It is this opportunity for self-education that constitutes 
the ultimate gift.  
 
That is All!  
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